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1 Introduction
Following the Maastricht treaty the European Monetary Union (EMU) started on
January 1, 1999 with a core group of the following 11 countries (the so-called EMU
first-wave member states): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In the meantime, four other coun-
tries have entered the euro zone, namely Greece on January 1, 2001, Slovenia on
January 1, 2007 and Cyprus and Malta both on January 1, 2008. As an important
technical stipulation accompanying the adoption of the euro, each EMU member state
had to fix its exchange rate at its central parity from the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) on its EMU entrance date.
A key question for all EMU countries in the run-up to their respective EMU ac-
cessions was how to implement an optimal transition from the pre-EMU system of
floating exchange rates into the fixed-rate system of the euro zone.1 In this context,
many politicians and economists advocated the implementation of so-called institu-
tional frontloading strategies. The basic idea behind this policy design was to coor-
dinate exchange-rate and monetary policies of the future EMU countries prior to the
eventual exchange-rate fixing such that the following two objectives could be achieved:
(a) The prevention of inherent speculative attacks, and (b) the credible steering of the
exchange rates towards their final conversion rates in the case of severe misalignments
prior to the fixed-rate system (see, among others, De Grauwe, 1996; Obstfeld, 1998).
In this paper we try to quantify the degree of such interventionist pre-EMU policies
for the majority of the current euro-zone countries.2 In order to achieve this, we take up
and extend an econometric framework developed in Trede and Wilfling (2007). Tech-
nically speaking, their methodology consists in estimating a mean-reversion parameter
from a continuous-time monetary exchange-rate model on the basis of discretely sam-
pled observations via a maximum likelihood approach. In this paper, we basically
adopt their approach, but extend the analysis in three respects. First, we apply the
estimation procedure to all of the above-mentioned EMU exchange-rate series, that is
we process a much larger data set.3 Second, we plug the estimation technology in a
1Before January 1999, all EMU first-wave countries were members of the ERM and as such their
currencies were kept in exchange rate bands of more or less wide band width (in general ±15% around
the central parity). After the start of EMU on January 1, 1999, the former ERM was replaced by the
ERM II, a target-zone system in which all participating currencies have central parities against the
euro with fluctuation band width of ±15%.
2In particular, we include all first-wave member states plus Greece and Slovenia in our econometric
analysis, but exclude the small economies of Cyprus and Malta.
3Trede and Wilfling (2007) focus on the derivation of the econometric technique and only analyze
the Greek drachma.
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2
sequential analysis in order to make statistical inference about the dynamic evolution
of interventionist policies in the run-up to EMU. Finally, we validate our empirical
results by applying an exchange market pressure (EMP) model.
The key result of our study is that interventionist policies are likely to have played
an important role in some EMU countries, but not in others. Our overall results should
be of interest to at least two groups of economic agents. First, to the policy makers of
future EMU accession countries who are faced with the implemention of an adequate
monetary policy that aims at entering the euro zone under financial market tranquility.
Second, the results of our sequential analysis should prove useful to financial market
participants for whom knowledge about an active monetary policy stance might provide
profitable information.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the continuous-
time monetary exchange-rate model which forms the theoretical basis of our estimation
framework. The data, the econometric estimation technique, the empricical results and
a robustness check are presented in Section 3. Section 4 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Previous results and preliminaries
In this section we present a theoretical exchange-rate model in continuous time which
is capable of tracing the exchange-rate evolution in the run-up to a currency union and
which potentially accounts for an increasing interventionist policy stance during this
period. Essentially, our model represents a special stochastic version of the well-known
class of monetary exchange-rate models with flexible prices which became popular at
the beginning of the 1990s in the modeling of exchange-rate dynamics under specific
exchange-rate regimes.4
To set up the theoretical exchange-rate model, we consider a world with two open
economies under perfect capital mobility in which the political authorities of both
countries decide to create a currency union on the future date tS. On the analogy
of EMU, the authorities therefore announce at date tA (the announcement date) to
irreversibly fix the presently floating exchange rate from the starting date tS onwards
at the specific parity x (the conversion rate at which both economies enter the currency
union).
In order to derive an explicit exchange-rate path under such a time-contingent switch
in exchange-rate regime from floating to fixed rates, it is convenient to consider the
4The seminal paper of this strand of literature is Krugman (1991) who presents a model of exchange-
rate behavior in a permanent target zone. For an early overview of this class of models see Bertola
(1994) and the literature cited there.
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3
well-known monetary exchange-rate model with flexible prices in continuous time. In
this model with rational expectations, the logarithmic spot rate at time t, x(t), equals
the sum of an exogenously given macroeconomic fundamental, k(t), plus a speculative
component representing the agents’ expectations about future changes in the currency
value:
x(t) = k(t) + α · E[dx(t)|φ(t)]
dt
, α > 0, (1)
where E[·|·] denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information set φ(t)
which contains all information available to market participants at time t.5
Within the original multi-equation monetary flex-price model the exchange-rate
Eq. (1) represents a reduced form and the macroeconomic fundamental k(t) measures
the effects of different variables such as real output differentials (between the domestic
and the foreign economy), money supply differentials and stochastic shocks to money
demand on the exchange rate. The positive parameter α represents the semi-elasticity
of real money demand with respect to a short-term interest rate (see for example Froot
and Ostfeld 1992).
Besides constituting the reduced form of the monetary flex-price model, Eq. (1) may
simply be viewed as a standard valuation equation which emphasizes the asset-price
character of the exchange rate (see among others De Grauwe et al. 1999). Within
this general framework, we can think of the fundamental k(t) as a collection of all
economic and political factors that agents consider to be important for the valuation
of the current exchange rate. Here, typical factors affecting k(t) include central bank
interventions and virtually any other economic activity which changes the relative
supply-to-demand conditions of the home currency. In this setting, α represents a
parameter weighting the fundamental component against the speculative motives for
currency valuation.
An important feature of the exchange-rate Eq. (1) is that it allows us to model
alternative types of monetary policy regimes in the run-up to the currency union.
Technically, we achieve this by letting the exogenous fundamental k(t) evolve over time
as a specific stochastic process that is capable of capturing the main characteristics of
the policy regime under consideration. In this paper, we consider an institutional
frontloading regime with continuously increasing interventionist activity towards the
entrance into the currency union at date tS. Such an exchange-rate regime can be
modeled by letting the fundamental k(t) follow a scaled Brownian bridge with stochastic
5In Eq. (1), E[dx(t)|φ(t)]/dt is an abbreviation of lims→0{E[x(t+s)|φ(t)]−x(t)}/s. Since x denotes
the log nominal exchange rate, E[dx(t)|φ(t)]/dt represents the expected (instantaneous) rate of change
in the nominal exchange rate.
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differential representation
dk(t) =
η · [x− k(t)]
tS − t dt+ σ · dw(t) for t ∈ [tA, tS), (2)
with σ > 0 denoting the so-called instantaneous standard deviation and dw(t) the
increment of a standard Wiener process. Assuming η ≥ 0, we see that the drift term
η·[x−k(t)]/(tS−t) represents the force that keeps pulling the fundamental k towards the
long-run exchange-rate target value x in case of a current deviation of the fundamental
process from the target x. At this point it is informative to recall that in our EMU
framework the target value x coincides with the ERM central parity and thus the final
conversion rate.
The modeling of target- (or mean-)reversion in the fundamental process k(t), for
which specification (2) is an example, is a well-established concept in the literature
on exchange-rate dynamics (Froot and Obstfeld, 1992). In principle, there are many
conceivable economic sources that might induce target-reversion in the fundamental
process (such as specific institutional characteristics of the foreign exchange market and
certain perceptions of foreign exchange traders). However, the traditional literature on
exchange-rate dynamics under specific monetary regimes (for example under a target
zone) ascribes the major portion of fundamental target-reversion to an interventionist
policy stance (Delgado and Dumas, 1992; Lindberg and So¨derlind, 1992; Svensson,
1992) and it is exactly this view that we adopt here.6
Keeping this in mind and noting that the drift term η · [x− k(t)]/(tS − t) is ceteris
paribus increasing in absolute value proportional to the inverse of the remaining time
until the currency union is implemented, we arrive at the following interpretation of
Eq. (2): as t→ tS the strength of target-reversion approaches infinity with probability 1
whenever η > 0 so that the Brownian Bridge process in Eq. (2) consistently models an
institutional frontloading regime with continuously increasing interventionist activity
towards the currency union starting at date tS. To highlight the role of the parameter
η in the drift term, we from now on refer to η as the intervention intensity.
In conjunction with the Brownian bridge specification (2), the general law of exchange-
rate evolution in Eq. (1) represents a stochastic differential equation. This can be
solved by stochastic integration techniques and the imposition of adequate economic
constraints which appropriately reflect the anticipations of foreign exchange market
6It should be noted, however, that it may prove difficult to empirically detect the degree of mean
reversion in structural exchange-rate models derived from the monetary flex-price equation (1). See
for example Iannizzotto and Taylor (1999) and Taylor and Iannizzotto (2001) who treat this issue for
exchange rates in a target zone.
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5
participants regarding the entrance of both countries into the currency union on date
tS at the conversion rate x. Ruling out arbitrage opportunities at the moment of
transition into the currency union, i.e. imposing the condition limt→tS x(t) = x with
probability 1, Trede and Wilfling (2007) derive the (bubble-free) solution to Eq. (1) as
x(t) = x+
k(t)− x
α(tS − t)η ·
∫ tS
t
e(t−r)/α · (tS − r)ηdr for t ∈ [tA, tS). (3)
In the next section, we will estimate this structural exchange-rate equation on the basis
of discretely sampled data for the present EMU countries.
3 Econometric analysis
3.1 Data
Our original data consist of daily spot exchange rates of all EMU first-wave currencies
plus exchange-rate time series of the Greek drachma and the Slovenian tolar. All
EMU first-wave member currencies are analyzed vis-a-vis the German mark (DEM)
while the Greek drachma and the Slovenian tolar are both analyzed vis-a-vis the euro.7
All exchange rates were compiled from the historical tables of the OANDA-FXTrade-
Website and are daily averages of interbank rates recorded seven days a week.8 Figure
1 depicts the eleven EMU exchange-rate series.
[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 1 (continued) here]
As indicated in the exchange-rate Eq. (3), the sampling period of each currency has
to be chosen as the time interval [tA, tS). For all EMU first-wave currencies tS coincides
with January 1, 1999, while for the Greek drachma and the Slovenian tolar tS coincides
with January 1, 2001, and January 1, 2007, respectively.
In contrast to the determination of tS, it turns out to be far more difficult to find
the empirical counterpart to the announcement date tA from the theoretical model.
The reason is that our theoretical model in Section 2 presumes that the announcement
at date tA generates news to market participants insofar as at that date the future
entrance into the currency union (and thus the future switch in exchange-rate regime
from floating to fixed rates) is announced and that this announcement comes as a
7It should be noted that the two EMU first-wave members Luxembourg and Belgium already
shared a common currency, the Belgian franc, prior to the adoption of the euro.
8See the OANDA-website at http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory (download from July 25,
2007).
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6
surprise to market participants. In reality, however, agents in the foreign exchange
market typically are well-informed and behave rationally. Consequently, agents must
be supposed to anticipate a prospective future EMU entrance long before any official
announcement. As a result, they incorporate this anticipation into their currency
valuation schemes.
A feasible approach to overcoming this inconsistency between the theoretical exchan-
ge-rate model and the real-world information structure on foreign exchange markets is
to reinterpret the announcement date tA from the theoretical model as the so-called
date-of-first-notice, that is as the date at which real-world foreign exchange market par-
ticipants perceive a potential future EMU entrance for the first time. Wilfling (2009)
adopts this view and elaborates an econometric framework which makes it possible to
detect the dates-of-first-notice for the majority of the EMU currencies considered here.
Technically speaking, this framework makes use of the theoretically well-grounded re-
sult that exchange rates are subject to switching volatility-regimes during the transition
from floating to fixed exchange rates. Such volatility regime-switches, which stem from
changes in financial markets’ assessments of a country’s prospective EMU participation
(i.e. of its future entrance into a fixed exchange-rate system) can be captured satis-
factorily by so-called Markov-switching GARCH models. An important feature of this
class of time-series models is that they offer inferential techniques which are capable of
locating the volatility regime-switching dates thus helping us to detect the empirical
counterparts of the dates tA (i.e. the dates-of-first-notice).
Wilfling (2009) covers exactly the same currencies as we do here. Table 1 displays
the empirical announcement dates as they have been identified by his volatility regime-
switching approach. However, his analysis fails in identifying tA for the Austrian
shilling, the Spanish peseta and the Slovenian tolar. As a result, we exclude these
currencies from our econometric analysis below.
[Insert Table 1 here]
3.2 Estimation technique
We now address the estimation of the structural exchange-rate Eq. (3). We are pri-
marily interested in the country-specific estimates of the mean-reversion parameter η
which may provide important information on the degree of interventionist exchange-
rate policies in the run-up to EMU.
We estimate the model parameters α, η and σ by maximum-likelihood as suggested
by Singer (1998). This method is capable of coping with the non-stationarity of the
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7
driving stochastic process k(t) as defined in Eq. (2). Our observations are n timings
(our time unit is one year) and the corresponding exchange rates:
(t1, x(t1)), ..., (tn, x(tn)).
Following Trede and Wilfling (2007), the loglikelihood function conditioned on the
first observation is
ln(α, η, σ) =
n∑
i=2
ln(p(ti−1, xi−1, ti, xi;α, η, σ)), (4)
with p(ti−1, xi−1, ti, xi;α, η, σ) denoting the transition density from xi−1 to xi between
the dates ti−1 and ti (where, for ease of notation, we write xi ≡ x(ti)). Since at each date
ti the exchange rate xi is a linear function of the Gaussian fundamental process k(ti),
the transition densities in the loglikelihood function (4) are also Gaussian. Moreover,
linearity implies that the mean and the variance of xi conditional upon the information
set φ(ti−1) can be derived from conditional means and variances of the fundamental
process k(ti), which according to Eq. (2) are given by
E[k(ti)|φ(ti−1)] =
(
tS − ti
tS − ti−1
)η
k(ti−1) +
(
1−
(
tS − ti
tS − ti−1
)η)
x, (5)
V ar[k(ti)|φ(ti−1)] = σ
2(tS − ti−1)
2η − 1
(
tS − ti
tS − ti−1 −
(
tS − ti
tS − ti−1
)2η)
. (6)
Using Equation (3) and defining
I(t, tS) ≡
∫ tS
t
e(t−r)/α · (tS − r)ηdr,
we obtain the following moments for the exchange rate:
E(xi|φ(ti−1)) = xi−1 + (xi−1 − x)
(
I(ti, tS)
I(ti−1, tS)
− 1
)
, (7)
V ar(xi|φ(ti−1)) = σ
2I2(ti, tS)
α2(2η − 1)
(
(tS − ti)1−2η − (tS − ti−1)1−2η) . (8)
The transition density is given by
p(ti−1, xi−1, ti, xi;α, η, σ) =
1√
V ar(xi|φ(ti−1))ϕ
(
xi − E(xi|φ(ti−1))
V ar(xi|φ(ti−1))
)
, (9)
with ϕ(u) denoting the probability density function of a standard normal variate. From
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8
all these elements, we finally obtain the loglikelihood function as
ln(α, η, σ) = −12
n∑
i=2
(xi − E(xi|φ(ti−1)))2
V ar(xi|φ(ti−1)) −
1
2
n∑
i=1
ln(V ar(xi|φ(ti−1)))− n2 ln(2pi).
(10)
In order to find reasonable starting values for the optimization of the loglikelihood
function (10), we apply a three-dimensional grid with respect to the parameters α, η
and σ. For statistical inference on the parameter estimates, we use the final information
matrix from the optimization procedure as the estimated covariance matrix.
In what follows, we refer to the estimation procedure just described as non-sequential,
since we use the entire sampling period to estimate the intensity parameter η. This
estimate sheds light on the question of whether or not we can measure a statistically
significant target-reverting force that might have steered a currency towards its final
conversion rate. However, it is conceivable that the level of the intensity parameter
η changes throughout the sampling period, possibly indicating a modified intensity of
interventionist activity. To account for this, we additionally apply our estimation pro-
cedure to a sampling window which continuously expands over time and subsequently
refer to this approach as sequential.
To be more specific, within the sequential framework we enlarge the estimation
window on a daily basis until the start of the currency union at date tS. In technical
words, we sequentially estimate the exchange-rate path (3) for the sampling periods
[tA, tn) with
tn = tA + γ +∆, tA + γ + 2∆, . . . , tS, (11)
where ∆ = 1/365, which is equivalent to one day, and the constant γ guarantees
a minimal number of observations in each estimation window so that our estimation
procedure finds a meaningful optimum of the loglikelihood function. Preliminary calcu-
lations show that this minimal number of observations should be equal to 100 implying
that γ should be set equal to 99/365 in Eq. (11).
Under the assumptions of our model the maximum-likelihood estimators are asymp-
totically normally distributed. As the finite-sample distribution might deviate from
normality we implement a bootstrap hypothesis-testing approach following MacKin-
non (2007). For this, we denote the usual t-statistic of the test H0 : η = 0 versus
H1 : η 6= 0 by τˆ . The p-value is the probability that the test statistic τˆ is larger (in
absolute value) than the estimate actually calculated from the original sample. The
finite-sample distribution of the test statistic underH0 is approximated by a parametric
bootstrap. We simulate a large number (B = 1000) of synthetic exchange-rate paths
conditional on the point estimators αˆη=0, σˆη=0 and η = 0. The three parameters α, σ
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9
and η are then re-estimated from each synthetic sample. The bootstrapped t-statistics
of the null hypothesis are τ ∗j , j = 1, . . . B. Following MacKinnon (2007), we perform a
two-tailed test9 with the bootstrapped p-value estimated by
pˆ∗(τˆ) = 1
B
B∑
j=1
1{x∈R:|x|>|τˆ |}
(
τ ∗j
)
,
where 1A(·) denotes the indicator function of the subset A ⊂ R. These bootstrapped
p–values are derived for every exchange-rate series.
3.3 Empirical results
Table 2 displays the non-sequential estimation results for the eight exchange-rate time
series described in Table 1. The estimation results suggest a split among the eight
currencies into two groups. The first group consists of the Belgian franc, the Dutch
guilder, the Finnish markka, the French franc and the Greek drachma each of which
exhibit significant point estimates for all of the three parameters α, η und σ. The Irish
punt, the Italian lira and the Portuguese escudo, forming the second group, mostly
exhibit insignificant point estimates for the parameters η and α.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Comparing the η-estimates of the currencies from the first group, we find indication
of a low degree of interventionist activities for the Belgian franc (ηˆ = 0.541), indication
of a medium degree for the Dutch guilder (ηˆ = 1.003),10 the French franc (ηˆ = 1.777)
and the Greek drachma (ηˆ = 1.238),11 and indication of a high level of interventionist
activities for the Finnish markka (ηˆ = 2.883). The η-estimates of the three currencies
from the second group (the Irish punt, the Italian lira and the Portuguese escudo) are
not indicative of a significant degree of interventionist activities.
Next, we extend our findings from the non-sequential analysis. For this, we take
a closer look at the dynamic properties of the intervention intensity parameter η by
sequentially estimating the exchange-rate path (3) on the basis of expanding sampling
periods [tA, tn) as described in Eq. (11). Figure 2 displays the respective series of the
9We assume τˆ to be symmetrically distributed around zero.
10For the Dutch guilder we report the bootstrapped standard error. For all other currencies the
conventional standard errors are confirmed by the bootstrap analysis. The results of our bootstrap
hypothesis-testing approach are available upon request.
11Our point estimate ηˆ for the Greek drachma differs slightly from the estimate given in Trede and
Wilfling (2007) since we use seven instead of five exchange-rate observations per week.
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last hundred sequential η-estimates (i.e. tn = tS − 100/365, tS − 99/365, . . . , tS) for the
Dutch guilder, the Finnish markka, the French franc, the Greek drachma, the Italian
lira and the Portuguese escudo.12 In order to assess statistical significance, we have
added (pointwise) 95% confidence bands around the sequential point estimates ηˆ to
each panel in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The key insight of Figure 2 is that the currency-specific dynamics of the η-estimates
often reveal successive phases with changing significance of the η-parameter. The Dutch
guilder, for example, exhibits a significant η-parameter in the non-sequential estimation
based on the entire sample. Yet, in the sequential analysis we find significant η-values
only when considering the last week of the expanding sample. Here, the η-estimates
range between 0.72 and 1.19. A case revealing a somewhat reversed pattern to the
Dutch guilder is the Italian lira. For the Italian lira we find a non-significant η-estimate
in the non-sequential estimation, but significant estimates in the sequential analysis on
an interval covering a few weeks between mid-November and mid-December 1998 with
estimated intervention intensities ranging between 0.71 and 1.68.
The Finnish markka and the Greek drachma exhibit qualitatively similar patterns
with respect to the dynamics of their η-estimates. In the sequential analyses, the vast
majority of the η-estimates are significant and show a tendency to increase over time.
A similar (but less pronounced) behavior is also revealed by the French η-estimates.
Finally, the sequential η-estimates of the Portuguese escudo appear to be in close
line with the findings in the non-sequential analysis. The sequential η-estimates are not
statistically different from zero throughout the entire expanding estimation window.
3.4 Robustness check via an EMP model
In order to assess the validity of our empirical results from the previous section, we
apply a simplified version of an exchange-market-pressure (EMP) model due to Wey-
mark (1995, 1997). The general idea behind measuring exchange market pressure is to
model money market disequilibria that arise from the excess demand or supply of the
domestic currency. Generally, the pressure on the exchange rate can be relieved either
by allowing the exchange rate to revalue or by changes in the stock of foreign exchange
12For the Belgian franc and the Irish punt our sequential approach frequently failed in finding
a reasonable maximum of the loglikelihood function. Thus, we excluded both currencies from the
sequential analysis.
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reserves (assuming non-sterilized foreign exchange market interventions). Adopting
the setup of Weymark (1997) this may be formalized as
EMPt = ∆xt + δ∆rt, (12)
where the exchange market pressure at date t (EMPt) is expressed as the weighted sum
essentially consisting of the percentage change in the observed exchange rate (∆xt) plus
the change in foreign exchange reserves expressed as a proportion of the monetary base
(∆rt). The elasticity δ = −∂∆xt/∂∆rt constitutes a ’model-specific conversion factor
that allows the disparate units in which exchange rate and reserve changes are measured
to be combined into a single, composite measure of external imbalance’ (Weymark,
1997).
Provided that EMPt 6= 0, Eq. (12) can equivalently be written as
1 =
∆xt
EMPt
+
δ∆rt
EMPt
. (13)
This last equation relates the two alternative proportions of exchange market pressure
relieved by (a) the observed exchange-rate change ∆xt, and (b) by the intervention
activity ∆rt of the domestic authorities. The term δ∆rt/EMPt on the right-hand side
of Eq. (13) is particularly important since the change in the foreign exchange reserves
is solely determined by the activities of the domestic authorities. Therefore, Weymark
(1997) defines her intervention activity index by
ωt ≡ δ∆rtEMPt , (14)
which, by virtue of Eq. (12), can explicitly be calculated as
ωt =
δ∆rt
∆xt + δ∆rt
=
∆rt
(1/δ)∆xt +∆rt
. (15)
A problem arises when calculating the intervention index ωt from real-world data
since the elasticity δ is not directly observable, but has to be estimated from the data.
In the literature, this is frequently achieved by specifying a structural model from
which first δ can be characterized and estimated by observable variables so that ωt
can ultimately be computed as in Eq. (15). In this paper, however, we apply a model-
independent approach suggested by Eichengreen et al. (1995) according to which the
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elasticity δ formally obtains as
δ = −
√
V ar(∆xt)
V ar(∆rt)
, (16)
on the basis of which we first estimate δ and then calculate the intervention index ωt.
The intervention index ωt can be interpreted as follows: When ω1 = 1 the central
bank intervenes to keep the exchange rate fixed. When ωt = 0 the central bank refrains
from intervening and lets the exchange rate float freely. Values between 0 and 1 indicate
that the central bank has intervened in order to reduce the pressure on the exchange
rate. Negative values (ωt < 0) signal the central bank’s attempt to magnify exchange
rate changes. When ω > 1 the intervention pushes the exchange rate into the opposite
direction as compared to what would have occurred without intervention. It should be
noted that ωt is very sensitive to the relative magnitudes of δ,∆xt and ∆rt so that ωt
can take on extremely large absolute values. For this reason, we follow Jeisman (2005)
and censor the intervention index by 2 when ωt > 2 and by −1 when ωt < −1.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 shows the monthly intervention indices derived by the EMP approach for
all 8 EMU currencies described in Table 1. In addition to our exchange-rate data used
in the previous sections, we processed monthly data for the foreign exchange reserves
and the monetary base which we compiled from the International Financial Statistics
(IMF).
The EMP results appear to be in line with the overall picture of our exchange-rate
estimation results from the previous section. Our non-sequential estimation results in
Table 2 exhibit a significant parameter η (the intervention intensity in our monetary
exchange-rate model) for the Belgian franc, the Dutch guilder, the Finnish markka, the
French franc and the Greek drachma. Interestingly, the intervention index ωt from the
EMP approach reveals a compatible pattern for these currencies. In the second half
of 1998 (2000 in the case of Greece) many ω-values exceed the value 1 indicating that
central banks seemed to have intervened in order to reverse movements of the respective
exchange rates. In the case of the Dutch guilder the negative ω-value in December 1998
suggests that the central bank magnified the convergence of the guilder towards the
EMU conversion rate. This finding is in line with the sequential η-estimates for the
Dutch guilder in Figure 2, which indicate a significant intervention intensity during the
last week of 1998.
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For the Irish punt, the Italian lira and the Portuguese escudo our non-sequential
estimation results from Table 2 do not indicate any evidence of interventionist ac-
tivities in the run-up to EMU. For the Irish punt and the Italian lira this finding is
confirmed by the EMP approach. Both currencies’ ω-values mostly range between 0
and 1 during 1998 suggesting that the respective central banks made no significant
attempt to magnify or to reverse the exchange-rate movements. In the case of the
Portuguese escudo, however, our estimation framework and the EMP approach lead to
slightly incompatible results. In contrast to our η-estimates from both the sequential
and the non-sequential analysis, the Portuguese ω-values from the EMP model in the
second half of 1998 suggest that the central bank may have attempted to magnify the
movements of the escudo.
4 Conclusions
This paper estimates structural pre-EMU exchange-rate equations for the majority of
the present euro-zone countries. On the basis of a continuous-time model of exchange-
rate dynamics we estimate an explicit target-reversion parameter which we interpret
as an indicator of an interventionist policy stance taken up by the monetary and po-
litical authorities. In order to bolster up inferential results we conduct a sequential
estimation analysis. Overall, our empirical findings are indicative of active pre-EMU
policy stances in various countries (pointing to the implementation of institutional
frontloading strategies).
However, a word of caution seems to be in order. It should be noted that the target-
reversion parameter η, which we interpret as a potential indicator of interventionist
activities, may simply express the (speed of) convergence of a currency towards its final
conversion rate shortly before the entrance into the currency union. But the speed of
this exchange-rate convergence might have also been caused by other factors outside the
authorities’ control, for example by institutional characteristics of the foreign exchange
market or the (time-varying) anticipations of foreign exchange traders and their removal
of arbitrage opportunities at the moment of transition into the system of fixed exchange
rates.13
As disentangling the effects of all potential factors is generally impossible from an
econometric point of view due to data limitations, two alternative routes to mitigate
this problem are conceivable. First, one could try to gather evidence of institutional
frontloading strategies from the regular releases of the financial institutions involved
13Cf. the remarks on the exchange-rate equation (1) in Section 2.
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(for example from central-bank reports etc.). However, financial institutions are not
obliged and generally do refuse to publish the extent of interventions in the foreign
exchange market or the exertion of other exchange-rate affecting instruments. Thus,
we cannot be sure that institutional releases contain all necessary information and
therefore have refrained from analyzing such reports here.14
Second, one could perform a robustness check using an alternative methodology to
elicit information about the intervention intensity. We compared our estimation results
with a simple EMP model to confirm the possibility of sustained intervention in the
foreign exchange market. Here, the key finding is that the EMP model produces results
which are largely compatible with our estimates of the target-reversion parameter η
from our sequential and non-sequential procedures. Therefore, we interpret high η-
estimates as a signal potentially indicating an interventionist policy.
Our estimation technology and in particular its embedding into the sequential frame-
work should be of interest to several economic actors of upcoming EMU accession
countries. As suggested above, policy makers often tend to be restrictive in providing
prompt information on interventionist activities. Yet, information on such activities is
of high value for traders in all sorts of financial and derivative markets, for example for
valuing exchange-rate and interest-rate sensitive claims. To these agents our sequential
analysis may signal an active policy stance supporting them in their financial decisions.
Apart from that, other actors may simply be concerned with the probability of a
specific country qualifying for future EMU admission. At the end of the 1990s this
kind of uncertainty about entering the currency union punctually as scheduled by the
Maastricht treaty led to the construction of so-called EMU probability calculators (see
Bates, 1999, for an overview and in-depth comparison between alternative methodolo-
gies). Since our sequential estimation procedure provides an alternative approach to
extracting information on pre-EMU monetary policies from financial market data, it
can be regarded as a complement to the EMU-probability-calculator strand of litera-
ture.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Exchange rates
Figure 1: (continued)
Figure 2: Sequential estimates for η (bold lines) plus 95% confidence bands
Figure 3: Monthly intervention indices ωt derived by the EMP model
Figure 3: (continued)
Table 1: Currency-specific sampling periods [tA, tS)
Table 2: Estimation results of the non-sequential analysis
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Figure 1: Exchange rates
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Figure 1: (continued)
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Figure 2: Sequential estimates for η (bold lines) plus 95% confidence bands
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Figure 3: Monthly intervention indices ωt derived by the EMP model
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Table 1: Currency-specific sampling periods [tA, tS)
Currency Empirical announcement Date of final Number of
date (tA) conversion (tS) observ. (n)
Belgian franc May 5, 1998 January 1, 1999 243
Dutch guilder November 5, 1997 January 1, 1999 423
Finnish markka November 12, 1997 January 1, 1999 416
French franc October 21, 1997 January 1, 1999 438
Greek drachma March 1, 2000 January 1, 2001 219
Irish punt May 20, 1998 January 1, 1999 227
Italian lira April 4, 1998 January 1, 1999 275
Portuguese escudo December 17, 1997 January 1, 1999 381
Notes : The empirical announcement dates are compiled from the preliminary analysis in
Wilfling (2009).
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Table 2: Estimation results of the non-sequential analysis
α η σ
Belgian franc 0.003 0.541 0.001
(0.001)∗ (0.251)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Dutch guilder 0.031 1.003 0.002
(0.032)∗∗∗ (0.321)∗,(1) (0.000)∗∗∗
Finnish markka 0.025 2.883 0.007
(0.008)∗∗∗ (0.777)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
French franc 0.050 1.777 0.002
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.467)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Greek drachma 0.023 1.238 0.007
(0.007)∗∗∗ (0.290)∗∗∗ (0.000)∗∗∗
Irish punt 0.010 1.121 0.050
(0.007) (1.082) (0.003)∗∗∗
Italian lira 0.126 0.537 0.005
(0.045)∗∗∗ (0.335) (0.000)∗∗∗
Portuguese escudo 0.024 0.395 0.003
(0.010)∗∗ (0.277) (0.000)∗∗∗
Notes : Standard errors are in parantheses. *, **, *** denote sta-
tistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. (1) The bootstrapped
standard error is reported.
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